Horizon Kinetics Japan Owner Operator ETF (JAPN)

Fall 2026 Update

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

The Aftermath of Japan's Lost Decades: The Best Place for Winning Entrepreneurs 3

Context and Consequences Post-1989 4

Reversing the Lost Decades 6

Owner-Operator-Advantaged Exposure to the Japanese Market 7

Case Study: Pan Pacific International Holdings (PPIH, 7532JP) 8

The Japan Index Paradox: Effects on Exposure, Performance, and Correlation 11

The Difference Between JAPN and the Major Indexes 12

Horizon Kinetics Japan Owner Operator ETF (JAPN)

Fall 2026 Update

Executive Summary

The Japan Owner-Operator ETF (JAPN, "the Fund") offers a distinct set of exposures to the investment opportunity in Japan—perhaps the main reason the Fund's performance is flat on the year while benchmarks like the TOPIX Index are up. Those indexes' gains are attributable to predominantly AI-related international companies. And while the numbers might look good amid the current data-center boom, the experience is basically the same as owning the S&P 500, with the same overconcentration concerns going forward.

Shareholders of the Fund, on the other hand, are participating in the legitimately intriguing domestic Japanese market, with meaningful allocations in firms like Pan Pacific International Holdings, the parent of a most unusual retail chain called Don Quijote. These companies are still guided by their founders—who, unlike most corporate CEOs, have significant equity skin in the game—and offer true exposure to Japan. Such exposure comes at an opportune moment, as the country's economy sits on the precipice of transformation, following several well-documented lost decades. Read on to get the full story.


The Aftermath of Japan's Lost Decades: The Best Place for Winning Entrepreneurs

On the surface, 2026 hasn't been the best year for the Japan Owner-Operator ETF (JAPN) thus far, with performance flat while other benchmarks are up. But JAPN represents a different benchmark and a wholly different set of exposures to a distinct investment opportunity in Japan.

To fully appreciate this, one must understand a bit of historical context. One should also understand that the return of the TOPIX Index this year is entirely attributed to the top 3.3% of the 1,660 constituents—predominantly AI-related companies. In this sense, one is neither observing or participating in the legitimately intriguing domestic Japanese market, but in the same systemic trade as owning the S&P 500.


Japan, for historical corporate culture and structural reasons, is an extraordinarily difficult place to start a new business, especially in terms of access to capital and resources. Risk capital is limited—less than 2% of that of the U.S., measured by venture capital investment. Japanese society honors lifelong employment, with limited mid-career recruiting opportunities the tradeoff for a stable lifestyle. Being an entrepreneur or working for a startup is seen as a high-risk career.


However, once an entrepreneur clears those hurdles and, with the right model, launches a business and enters the public market to further scale the operation, there is little direct competition from large incumbents or other newcomers.




Over the past few decades, Japan's major corporations typically have not been structured to transform legacy businesses or to invest in new opportunities. They endured Japan's deflationary economy, which began in the early 1990s and persisted until only recently. Supply stubbornly exceeded demand, and there was virtually no improvement in overcapacity (invested capital). There was a labor surplus.

Context and Consequences Post-1989







Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations data (ex-financial) on https://www.e-stat.go.jp


To illustrate how unusual Japan's situation has been for three decades, in a Western economic sense, consider this: During that same period, the U.S economy (red line in the first chart) had gone through a couple of economic cycles, including one in which the level of oversupply reached or even exceeded that of Japan. Yet it recovered faster, and to a higher subsequent level. The U.S. did not tolerate decades of a persistent deflationary economy.


In Japan, an economy in which there was no real demand for capital investment and labor, it is not a surprise that the potential economic growth rate—the long-term fundamental national economic growth outlook achieved through fully utilizing capital and labor—hardly reached 1%. This is extraordinarily low. In the U.S., the lowest was 1.3%, after the 2009 Global Financial Crisis.

Naturally, the slow multi-decade growth left Japan falling behind among developed counties; since 2000, Japan's economy grew just 16.5%, whereas the U.S expanded about 69%. At the corporate level, while each company's experience and industry formation can vary, the Ministry of Finance's Financial Statement Statistics of Corporations[1] draws a meaningful picture of Japanese corporates' statically defensive hunker-down attitudes.

[1] https://www.e-stat.go.jp

From the Japanese bubble's peak in 1989 through 2014—the year Abenomics (political, monetary, and fiscal growth policy) was implemented—the country's corporate average annual revenue growth and operating profit growth rates were 0.4% and 0.6%. In other words, virtually no growth. The operating profit margin, which bottomed out at an astonishingly low level of 3.5%, did not recover until 2013. The average operating profit margin was 2.7%—again, it is from this thin margin that corporates pay for tax, dividends, and (most importantly) capital investment.






Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry


Against this backdrop, Japanese corporates did not—and probably could not—invest. Oversupply and weak demand in the domestic economy did not help. Capex declined by more than half from the peak level in early 2000s, and even today remains below the peak level reached over three decades ago.

During the past three decades, despite the thin profit margin and flat revenues, Japanese corporates infamously managed to accumulate profit even after slowly growing dividend payments. As a result, corporate balance sheets further improved, and the equity value grew about five times.



Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry

One result is an equity-to-asset ratio that now exceeds 40%, but which came at the expense of global competitiveness, financial return, business profitability, and shareholder return. The corporates also deleveraged further; today, cash and investment securities represent over 30% of total assets. Japanese corporates, as a group, have strong balance sheets, with high levels of cash and investment securities, but incredibly low profitability.




Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry

Reversing the Lost Decades

In all fairness, the cash accumulation was not as detrimental as one might suppose, given the circumstance of a zero interest rate with virtually no inflation, as the cash retained its value. In this sense, inflation is another factor that could reverse the decades of non-capital allocation.

But now, with the reemergence of inflation for the first time in 30 years, the cost of goods and operations—including wages—are rising; and rising within the context of what has been a structurally thin profit margin. Firms must raise the price of products and services just to survive; more importantly, they must exit businesses with no pricing power, and reallocate those resources to value-added, higher-return, and higher-growth-prospects.



The same is true for investment allocation. The cash these companies accumulated during the past decades is now losing purchasing power; simultaneously, their operating assets, in which they essentially disinvested over time, are aging.

Capital allocation in the inflationary economy becomes naturally more selective; the prospective business must have higher growth and return on investment potential. And, unlike the preceding economic regime, delaying such investment will cost them more.

Owner-Operator-Advantaged Exposure to the Japanese Market


Japanese corporates are finally actively engaged in restructuring and consolidation—not necessarily for growth, but definitely for survival.

The entrepreneurs in which the Japan Owner Operator ETF (JAPN) invests have been building their businesses to scale, strengthening their competitive advantages during the deflationary era when the typical large corporations were sitting tight. They are now beginning to take advantage of the shifting winds in the economy.


And, unlike corporate CEOs, these entrepreneurs have skin in the game through their significant and personal equity positions in the companies they lead. Owner-operators in any market—it is a well-demonstrated phenomenon in the U.S.—generate far higher returns than conventional CEOs. They solve the persistent agency or incentive alignment problem that various equity incentive systems have failed to cure, though not for lack of trying. Here's one example that tells the story, and the story of the opportunity in Japan, as well as any.

Case Study: Pan Pacific International Holdings (PPIH, 7532JP)

In Japan's stagnant deflationary economy, consumers, too—not just corporates—cut back on spending; average household monthly spending peaked in 1993 at Y335,000 (or $2100, still below the peak in 2025). Japan's nationwide retail sales peaked in 1996 at Y146.3 trillion, and did not recover to that level until 2020, a full generation later.



The financing environment was never favorable, especially for small enterprise operators in Japan.



In this business environment, Pan Pacific International Holdings (PPIH) has achieved consecutive revenue and operating profit growth every year since it went public in 1996.

It may be hard to believe, but even Walmart—which had a tailwind of growing consumption and inflation that supported an almost tripling of U.S. retail sales during the same period—did not achieve that.

PPIH's success did not come overnight. In 1978, at age 29, founding chairman Takao Yasuda opened a small discount shop. There, he learned and experienced everything from procuring products at low cost to operating a store—including hiring, training, delegating work and responsibilities, and attracting customer traffic. He surprisingly found people shopping late into the night, too. At the time, large-retailer store hours were required to close by 8pm to protect small shops; the rule was lifted in 2000.

In 1989, at the peak of Japan's asset bubble, Yasuda opened the first Don Quijote store, which became today's discount shop format. Setting "Customer-First" as his driving corporate principle maximized gross profit. The majority of Don Quijote's merchandise was acquired for close to zero cost, procured from wholesalers who could not sell the items and had already written them down.

Don Quijote did not really have control over its merchandise or procurement—it could not even make additional orders for goods that sold well.

Thus, the model became all about how to source and sell items with almost zero procurement cost. Over time, the company developed a greater capability to adjust prices, manage marketing presentations to drive traffic to stores and improve sales, and use effective planograms (drawings and signs on the shelfs to attract customers to certain products—Yasuda once advertised off-brand pens by putting a sign next to them: "You are with luck if you can write with this pen to the end.") For customers, shopping at Don Quijote became entertainment—treasure hunting.

For founder Yasuda, expanding store operations necessitated a delegation of authority; it could not be done by one person, but through each store clerk facing customers and handling goods every day. Most of the store clerks in Japan are part-time workers; managers control their shifts—with some as short as just a couple hours a day—and assign specific tasks of store operation to them. Communication goes one way—from managers to clerks; clerks are not traditionally expected to improve operations or come up with new product ideas or better shelf layout. Nor are they incentivized to do so.

At Don Quijote, some stores do not even have full-time managers; in many cases, a manager looks after more than one store, and clerks handle day-to-day operations independently. This enabled continuous sales growth at the existing stores, and expansion through new store openings.

Today, PPIH has 548 Don Quijote discount stores in Japan; each location carries very different merchandising, optimized to fit to its location and customers. They carry only 50% to 60% of common goods, mostly food and household items, with about 20% now being the company's own private and OEM brands—category-specific third-party brands sold only at Don Quijote. This came about because, although the chain no longer has zero-cost merchandizing, its increasing scale enabled it to develop private and exclusive products.

These are actively created and developed based on customer feedback—one private brand, Jonetsu Kakaku—direct English translation: "Passionate Price"—is called a "People's Brand" instead of a "Private Brand" at PPIH, as ideas come from customers. The company keeps improving products based on customer feedback. This, too, is unique in Japan, where the incumbent corporate retailers have been more accustomed to dictating terms and fashions to customers rather than being responsive. This merchandizing strategy drives traffic to the stores, as consumers can obtain certain items only at Don Quijote.

In the historical deflationary environment, Don Quijote operated a low-margin, high-turnover model. About six years ago, the company started preparing to operate in an inflationary environment. It reviewed merchandizing to further improve profit margins, and accelerated emphasis on its private and OEM brands, which typically carry a ten-percentage-point-higher gross

margin; those developed internally are even higher. During the past five years, the period of highest inflation in decades, the company's gross and operating margins improved by 230 basis points. It now has one of the highest operating margins in the retail sector, at 7.2%.

The inflationary shift in the economy is structurally changing the retail market in Japan. Many, including the largest retailer, Aeon, face rising operating costs. There's electricity, staffing, and the struggle to stay profitable, as pricing directly impacts traffic.

Aeon is a conglomerate that operates general merchandise stores, supermarkets, discount stores, drugstores, credit card and financing/banking operations, real estate, shopping mall operations, and retail and financial businesses in other Asian countries. Its Japanese retail divisions' revenue exceeds Y8.8 trillion, about 3.6 times larger than that of PPIH, yet its operating profit is much lower, with merely a 1.3% operating margin. This year, its general merchandise store and supermarket suffered an operating loss.

Ticker	Company	Revenue ($ million)	Operating Profit ($ million)	Operating Profit Margin	5 year Revenue Growth	Price to Trailing Earning	Price to Free Cash Flow
7532 JP	PAN PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL	15,476	1,107	7.2%	7.4%	20.1	19.6
8267 JP	AEON CO LTD	67,819	1,712	2.5%	4.5%	39.0	17.9
WMT US	WALMART INC	713,163	29,825	4.2%	5.0%	42.0	70.0
COST US	COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP	303,154	11,685	3.9%	9.1%	47.6	46.8
TGT US	TARGET CORP	104,780	5,117	4.9%	2.3%	18.4	15.7

Source: Bloomberg, Company
USD=Y158

Just for the purpose of comparison, as of the most recent fiscal year's end, the operating profit margin of major U.S. retailers such as Walmart, Costco Wholesale, and Target were 4.2%, 3.9%, and 4.9%, respectively. PPIH has not just a higher operating margin, but it also grew faster (with the exception of Costco).

PPIH sees this as a great opportunity to gain market share, since it only has a 2.5% piece of the targeted ¥100 trillion retail market ($630 billion). Moreover, the company is now trying to gain share from convenience stores, as they are mostly franchise operations; each store has neither price control nor merchandising capability. PPIH aims to retain its capital and operating efficiency at a 15% return on equity as it takes on market share acquisition.

PPIH has a market capitalization of Y2,367 billion (about $15.5billion). For the June 2026 fiscal year, revenue and operating profit reached Y2,445 billion and Y175 billion, and generated Y115 billion free cashflow. The company spent about Y40 to 50 billion annually on store openings and improvements during the past ten years. It trades at 20 times trailing earnings, with a 5% free

cashflow yield—much more attractive than Aeon's P/E ratio of 39, or the average P/E of 36 and price-to-cashflow of 44 times (2.3% free cashflow yield) of those U.S. retailers.

Unlike in past decades, PPIH's targeted retail market value itself will now likely grow with inflation. It anticipates doubling revenue to Y4.2 trillion, with Y330 billion operating profit, by fiscal year 2035, which implies roughly Y253 billion in free cash flow. This is about 8.7% annual growth in free cashflow at merely about 4% market share at the current operating-margin level.

As the company successfully continues to gain traffic and share, as already seen with food companies shifting their product development and marketing to cater to winning retailers, PPIH should be able to further scale through its private and OEM brands. The flat margin scenario may be conservative, as there has never been true scale in the deflationary economy.

Chairman Yasuda owns 30.4% of the company, about $4.7 billion in value. This represents the majority of his wealth, yet it is not just a financial significance. The company is his "child" that he raised with his blood, sweat, and tears; he is committed to not selling a single share.[2]

Don Quijote operates differently from other retail stores in Japan, where standing out in any way is extraordinarily difficult. As the saying goes, tall trees almost always catch the most wind, and most often get cut down. Yasuda built only one operation; decisions do not come from headquarters but rather from the broader team, which focuses on customers' demand and feedback. Gaining unshakable popularity from them maximizes profits.

For owner-operators like Yasuda, the changing business environment is a major and extended competitive opportunity. The competitors, especially those that dominated the market with rigid store operations, are not fit to swiftly change their operations. In an inflationary environment, there will be clear winners that can take advantage; losers that were not prepared will be chased by margin contraction.

The Japan Index Paradox: Effects on Exposure, Performance, and Correlation

It's worth repeating that, during the first half of 2026, the Japanese market (represented by the TOPIX Index) followed a very similar dynamic to that of the U.S.as seen in S&P 500 Index. That is the spectacular outperformance of AI and data-center-supply-chain companies.

The ten-year correlation of Japan's equity market (TOPIX Index in USD) with the world (MSCI ACWI Index) is a remarkably high 0.8. This is despite Japan being just 5.2% in the index.

[2] Founder and Chaiman Takao Yasuda's autobiography, *Yasuuri Ou Ichidai* (*Life of Becoming the Discount King).*

From a systemic risk diversification perspective, owning the TOPIX is statistically no different for a U.S. investor, than owning the S&P Small Cap Index, which also has a correlation of 0.8 with the S&P 500.

The 18.6% rise in TOPIX, in JPY currency, during the period can be explained by the performance of the top 54 contributors, just 3.3% of the 1,660 constituents. The index was flat without them; indeed, the top 10 contributors made up just over 50% of the performance, climbing an average of 158%.

For the 18.6% rise, AI- and data-center-related companies added about 12.4% points and banks added 2.6% points. The two segments explain about 81% of the performance—67% and 14%, respectively.

Top 10 Contributors to the TOPIX Index Performance for the First Half of 2026

Ticker	Name	Performance (%)	Contribution to TOPIX Performance (%)	Weight on TOPIX 12/31/2025 (%)	Weight on TOPIX 6/30/2026 (%)
8035 JT	Tokyo Electron Ltd	127	10.3	1.5	2.9
6981 JT	Murata Manufacturing Co Ltd	255	8.8	0.6	1.9
8306 JT	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc	31	5.4	3.2	3.6
285A JT	Kioxia Holdings Corp	759	5.4	0.1	1.0
6857 JT	Advantest Corp	65	4.5	1.3	1.7
8316 JT	Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc	28	3.4	2.3	2.4
9984 JT	SoftBank Group Corp	36	3.4	1.8	2.1
6752 JT	Panasonic Holdings Corp	124	3.3	0.5	1.0
8411 JT	Mizuho Financial Group Inc	37	3.3	1.7	1.9
5803 JT	Fujikura Ltd	116	3.0	0.5	0.9
	Total	na	50.7	13.4	19.4
	Average	158	5.1	1.3	1.9

Source: Bloomberg, Horizon Kinetics

The index's top three detractors were—interestingly, from a data-center perspective—Toyota, Sony, and Nintendo, which require chips for their products, and will for the foreseeable future. They declined 17.5%, 18.2%, and 34.4%. This is despite the weakness in JPY (a 3.6% decline against USD), which typically leads to a higher share price due to their export-oriented business structure.

The Difference Between JAPN and the Major Indexes

JAPN's investment opportunity and portfolio are structurally different. The opportunity set is not in a specific market sector, nor does it depend on a particular interest rate level or other typical

systemic factors. It is not even dependent upon the growth prospects of the Japanese macro economy—many owner-operators cultivated business opportunities while enmeshed in the stagnant economic environment—or changes in the global competitive landscape of Japanese corporations.

Owner- operators are not changing their business portfolios upon the government's direction, or after the change in the broader business environment. They constantly review their businesses and act decisively to grow their long-term enterprise value. It is not about next quarter, or even the fiscal year; they invest and take a calculated risk to grow the value of their businesses.

They also seek maximization of their return on capital, which is a decidedly different metric than for the varied incentives of the ordinary hired executive, whether job security, cash bonus benchmarks or equity incentive formulas. JAPN portfolio companies' average return on equity is 17.8%, which is about 80% higher than that of the TOPIX Index at 10%. And, unlike the benchmark indexes in our sector, our investments aren't centered around massive multinational companies that reflect international—rather than domestic Japanese—economic trends,

These are just a few of the factors that make JAPN a differentiated and economics-based index—and well-positioned to navigate, even benefit from, the shifting and perhaps disruptive economic landscape in Japan. Indeed, owner-operator companies tend to be disruptors themselves.

IMPORTANT RISK DISCLOSURES

Please consider carefully a fund's investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. For this and other important information, obtain a statutory and summary prospectus by visiting www.horizonkinetics.com/products/etf/japn. Read it closely before investing.

To access the Top 10 Holdings for JAPN, please click here: JAPN Top 10 Holdings

Fund holdings and sector allocations are subject to change at any time and should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

Top 10 Holdings as of October 31, 2026:

Furuno Electric Co Ltd	10.5
M&A Capital Partners Co Ltd	4.9
Resorttrust Inc	4.2
Finatext Holdings Ltd	4.1
Furyu Corp	4.0
Japan Elevator Service Holdings Co Ltd	3.8
Tsuburaya Fields Holdings Inc	3.7
ULS Group Inc	3.7
Hikari Tsushin Inc	3.6
Visional Inc	3.4
Total	**46.0**

Horizon Kinetics Japan Owner Operator ETF (JAPN)

Fall 2026 Update

Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns, and you may lose money. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment as of the date made and are subject to change without notice. This information should not be used as a general guide to investing or as a source of any specific investment recommendations.

The Horizon Kinetics Japan Owner Operator ETF (Symbol: JAPN) is an exchange traded fund managed by Horizon Kinetics Asset Management LLC (HKAM). HKAM is an investment adviser registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. You may obtain additional information about HKAM at our website at www.horizonkinetics.com.

Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Shares of any ETF are bought and sold at market price (not NAV), may trade at a discount or premium to NAV and are not individually redeemed from the Fund. Brokerage commissions will reduce returns. The Fund's investments in securities linked to real assets involve significant risks, including financial, operating, and competitive risks. Investments in securities linked to real assets expose the Fund to potentially adverse macroeconomic conditions, such as a rise in interest rates or a downturn in the economy in which the asset is located.

The Fund is non-diversified, meaning it may concentrate its assets in fewer individual holdings than a diversified fund. Therefore, the Fund is more exposed to individual stock volatility than a diversified fund.

Risks Related to Investing in Japan. Japan's economy has historically lagged that of its Asian neighbors and other major developed economies due in part to economic, political and social conditions. Japan's economic growth is heavily dependent on international trade, government support of the financial services sector and other troubled sectors, as well as governmental policy supporting its export market. However, slowdowns in the economies of key trading partners, such as the U.S. and China, leading to decreased demand from these countries, new trade regulations, and changes in exchange rates may also have an adverse impact on the economy of Japan.

Fund holdings and sector allocations are subject to change at any time and should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

The Fund invests in foreign securities which involve greater volatility and political, economic and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. These risks are greater for investments in emerging markets.

The Fund may invest in the securities of smaller and mid-capitalization companies, which may be more volatile than funds that invest in larger, more established companies. The fund is actively managed and may be affected by the investment adviser's security selections.

Note that indices are unmanaged and the figures shown herein do not reflect any investment management fee or transaction costs. Investors cannot directly invest in an index. References to market or composite indices or other measures of relative market performance (a "Benchmark") over a specific period are provided for your information only. Reference to a Benchmark may not reflect the manner in which a portfolio is constructed in relation to expected or achieved returns, portfolio guidelines, correlation, concentrations, volatility or tracking error targets, all of which are subject to change over time.

The Horizon Kinetics Japan Founders Index was created by Horizon. Any index returns or performance provided in this presentation is provided for illustrative purposes only and does not demonstrate actual performance.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against a loss in a declining market.

Risk Considerations: Investing in securities entails risk, which may be subject but not limited to the following—when investing in securities, the market may not necessarily have the same value assessment as the manager, and therefore, the performance of the securities may decline. Under no circumstance does the information contained herein represent a recommendation to buy, hold or sell securities. All material presented is compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is given as to its accuracy or completeness. The information presented is subject to further clarification during presentations, and may not be duplicated or communicated without the prior consent of Horizon Kinetics LLC.

HKAM does not provide tax or legal advice, all investors are encouraged to consult their tax and legal advisors regarding an investment in the Fund. You may obtain additional information about HKAM at our website at www.horizonkinetics.com.

No part of this material may be copied, photocopied, or duplicated in any form, by any means, or redistributed without the express written consent of HKAM.

The Horizon Kinetics Japan Owner Operator ETF (JAPN) is distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC ("Foreside"). Foreside is not affiliated with JAPN or Horizon Kinetics LLC or its subsidiaries.

Definitions:

TOPIX Index is a market benchmark with functionality as an investable index, covering an extensive proportion of the Japanese stock market.

Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA) Margin: is a financial metric that measures a company's operating profitability as a percentage of its total revenue.

Net Margin: is a ratio that measures the percentage of net income a company earns from its total revenue and reflects the overall profitability after expenses.

Return on Equity (ROE): is a ratio that measures a company's annual return on its shareholders' equity by dividing net income by shareholder's equity.

Revenue: represents the inflow of money before any expenses are deducted.

Revenue Growth: measures the rate at which a company's revenue increase or decrease over a specific period.

Operating Profit: Operating profit is the income earned from a company's core operations after deducting all operating expenses, excluding taxes and interest. It reflects the profitability of a business's primary activities and is often referred to as operating income or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).

Operating Profit Margin: is a profitability ratio that measures the percentage of profit a company earns from its operations before taxes and interest, calculated by dividing operating profit by total revenue.

Earnings Per Share (EPS) Growth: EPS is a measure of a company's profitability per share of stock. EPS growth refers to the increase or decrease in a company's EPS over a specific period.

Price to Earnings (P/E): is a metric that compares a company's stock price relative to its earnings per share.

Price to Book Value (P/B): is a metric that compares a company's stock price relative to its book value per share.

Price to Cash Flow (P/CF): is a metric that compares a company's stock price to its operating cash flow, indicating how much investors are willing to pay for each dollar of cash generated by the company.

Enterprise Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA): is a ratio that compares a company's value of a business relative to its EBITDA and is useful in comparing companies regardless of different capital structure.

Dividend Yield: is a ratio that measures how much a company pays in dividends each year relative to its stock price.

©2026 Horizon Kinetics LLC ® All rights reserved